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I.

INTRODUCTION

Lawyers everywhere, beginning with their law school training
through the bar admission process, and later in continuing legal education
courses, know that they may not make false statements of law or fact in litigation, or conceal material evidence. They are also forbidden from filing
and pursuing non-meritorious actions. The professional ethical duties and
prohibitions imposed on lawyers in litigation are enumerated under the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) and its state variants. These obligations collectively fall under the general duty to act with
“candor towards the tribunal,”2 and related prohibitions against dishonesty

2

See MODEL RULES OF PRO. RESP. CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). Rule 3.3 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial
measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse
to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter,
that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.

Id. Comment 2 of Rule 3.3 states:
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and acts prejudicial to the administration of justice.3 While the phrase,
“candor towards the tribunal” has multiple meanings, this and related ethical duties will be referred to in shorthand form as litigation misconduct.
This article examines the relationship between courts and lawyer
discipline agencies with respect to sanctions for litigation misconduct. It
will focus on the enforcement or non-enforcement of sanctions by lawyer
discipline agencies subsequent to court-ordered sanctions in the predicate
case. In other words, this article will address what happens when litigation
misconduct occurs, but (a) neither the court nor an aggrieved party was
aware of it during the litigation; (b) the trial court grants a sanctions request
against the offending lawyer; or (c) the sanctions request was considered
and denied, thus “exonerating” the lawyer. In these cases, the question is
whether lawyer discipline agencies investigate and prosecute subsequent

This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an
advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client’s case
with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the
client, however, is qualified by the advocate’s duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.
Id. at cmt. 2.
3
See id. at r. 8.4. Rule 8.4 states, in relevant part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so[;] . . .
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
[or]
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .
Id. Rule 3.4 states in relevant part:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’ s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value.
A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act; . . .
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability
of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
Id. at r. 3.4.
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complaints made against lawyers for litigation misconduct, or whether they
defer to the courts on the issue.
Part II presents a review of the literature on the subject, which is
scant. Some commentators note the reluctance of disciplinary agencies to
prosecute lawyers for litigation misconduct, preferring to refer the matter
back to the courts. Professor Peter Joy’s empirical study of the relationship
between Rule 11 sanctions and state disciplinary referrals is described.
While he supports the institutional choice made by lawyer discipline agencies toward non-prosecution, this article takes the opposite view.
Part III begins with a description of the three-stage process for
lawyer discipline in Illinois, which is initiated by the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (“ARDC”). It reviews recent prosecution data regarding cases of litigation misconduct. This is followed by a
review of the state supreme court cases relevant to litigation misconduct,
and the purpose and independence of the ARDC.
Part IV reviews the relevant standards that guide professional ethics and disciplinary enforcement for lawyer misconduct. These are contained in two sources: the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers and the
ABA’s Guidance on Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. As judged by
these standards, it appears that the ARDC failed to meet its responsibility to
the general public by refusing to investigate the litigation misconduct described herein.
Part V presents a case study of two lawyers alleged to have made
false statements of law and fact, concealed evidence, and filed an unwarranted sanctionable sanctions petition against a pro se litigant in an Illinois
small claims court. It then summarizes the reasons given by the ARDC for
refusing to investigate the allegations.
Part VI reports the results of a national survey of state lawyer disciplinary counsel regarding their willingness to conduct investigations into
litigation misconduct where courts either failed to rule on the misconduct
or ordered sanctions against offending lawyers. This part reports survey
responses from disciplinary counsel in twenty-nine jurisdictions (twentyseven states, plus the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Department of Justice).
Part VII discusses the reasons for prohibiting lawyer discipline
agencies from making the “institutional choice” to defer to courts in cases
involving litigation misconduct. This is followed by my recommendations
for disciplinary agencies’ review and investigation of litigation misconduct
complaints, as well as suggestions for future research. I conclude with the
hope that lawyer discipline agencies will maintain their independence from
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courts and pursue cases of litigation misconduct to retain public trust and
confidence in the justice system.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The issues raised in this article are linked to the role of the lawyer
as a zealous advocate for his or her client. The Preamble to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) states: “As advocate, a lawyer
zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”4 The role of advocate, however, is often inconsistent with the purported truth-finding function of courts. As Judge Marvin E. Frankel noted
in his classic article critical of the adversary system:
The advocate in the trial courtroom is not engaged much
more than half the time—and then only coincidentally—in
the search for truth. The advocate’s primary loyalty is to
his client, not to truth as such . . . . The business of the advocate, simply stated, is to win if possible without violating the law . . . . His is not the search for truth as such . . . .
[T]he truth and victory are mutually incompatible for some
considerable percentage of the attorneys trying cases at any
given time.5
But “[t]he duty to represent a client zealously and vigorously has
its limits.”6 The limits, of course, are the applicable state ethics rules that

4
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“[W]hen an opposing
party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same
time assume that justice is being done.”)
5
See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, LAWYERS’ ETHICS:
CONTEMPORARY DILEMMAS 99, 102-03 (Allan Gerson ed., 1980).
6
See James J. Brosnahan & Carol S. Brosnahan, The Attorney’s Ethical Conduct During Adversary Proceedings, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS 143, 148
(1978). The authors cite former ABA Canon 15 for this proposition:

Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers
as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge if its duties than does the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client’s
cause . . . .
Id. at 148 (quoting ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, CANON 15); see also J.E. Singleton,
CONDUCT AT THE BAR AND SOME PROBLEMS OF ADVOCACY 25 (1933) (“[T]he Court is entitled
to rely on Counsel to draw the attention of the Court to any case which is contrary to his contention if he knows of that case.”). The author also cites to an 1857 authority that states:
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are generally based on the MRPC. We know there are limits to zealous advocacy, but do lawyers face disciplinary actions for their litigation misconduct? In Jerome Carlin’s 1966 seminal study of lawyer ethics, he notes:
“The most frequent charges against lawyers involve wrongdoing against a
client, usually misappropriation of client funds. Much less frequent are accusations of offenses against the administration of justice, mainly submission of false or misleading testimony in a court or administrative agency.”7
The Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers acknowledges that
“[m]ost bar disciplinary agencies rely on the courts in which litigation occurs to deal with abuse. Tribunals usually sanction only extreme abuse.
Administration and interpretation of prohibitions against frivolous litigation
should be tempered by concern to avoid overenforcement.”8 Professor
Deborah Rhode concurs with this observation:
Lawyers and judges rarely report professional abuses, and
little effort has focused on counteracting the obvious economic and psychological barriers to reporting. Many attorneys do not feel sufficiently blameless to cast the first
stone unless they are sure of a fellow practitioner’s serious
misconduct . . . . As a consequence, most ethical violations
never reach regulatory agencies . . . . In the unusual cases
where judges or lawyers report abuses to bar agencies,

The zeal of the advocate may lead him into bye-paths, may tempt him to deviate from
that strict truthfulness for which he should ever be distinguished . . . . If . . . there
should be two eminent advocates in one Court, the loss of one of them would be a great
public evil. Should such a state of things exist as one commanding mind only at the
Bar, with a weak Judge upon the bench, the public interest would suffer. And if that
one barrister should not withal be strictly scrupulous, the nuisance would be intolerable.
Id. at 26. This is the risk when a self-represented litigant faces a lawyer representing their adversary, an illustration of which is the case study described herein.
7
See JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 15255 (1966). An early ABA report evaluating disciplinary enforcement included the following two
of thirty-six “Problems” observed by the committee that are relevant to this study: “No permanent
record of complaints and their processing,” and “Processing of complaints involving material allegations that also are the subject of pending civil or criminal proceedings.” GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD JR. AND DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND
REGULATION 425-26 (1985).
8
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 cmt. (b) (AM. L.
INST. 2000) (prohibiting “Frivolous Advocacy”). The definition of a “frivolous position” is “one
that a lawyer of ordinary competence would recognize as so lacking in merit that there is no substantial possibility that the tribunal would accept it[,]” whereas a nonfrivolous argument is one
that “includes a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”
Id. at cmt. (d).
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these agencies will often refer the case back to the courts
for final resolution, leaving the injured party stranded in
between.9
Commentators have noted the leniency of lawyer disciplinary
agencies in responding to allegations of litigation misconduct in the form of
false statements to the court.10 Professor Peter Joy conducted a relevant
study of the relationship between Rule 11 violations and professional discipline for the same misconduct.11 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes discretionary sanctions on lawyers or parties who engage
is various forms of litigation misconduct. It provides that, by signing any
paper submitted to the court, “or later advocating it,” an attorney or “unrepresented party”:
certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:12

9
See Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 694-95
(1994) (emphasis added); see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Questionable Claims: Election Fraud
Cases Highlight Ethics Rule on Baseless Complaints, ABA JOURNAL (Apr.–May, 2021) 32, 33
(quoting Columbia law professor Leslie Levin: “As a practical matter, discipline authorities almost never get involved in these sorts of matters . . . If the court doesn’t sanction the lawyer, disciplinary authorities often conclude that discipline is not warranted. If the courts do sanction the
lawyer, disciplinary authorities often feel like lawyers have been punished enough.”)
10
See Stephen Gillers, Lowering The Bar: How Lawyer Discipline in New York Fails to Protect the Public, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 485, 507-10 (2014).

[A] dishonest lawyer can cause more harm to more people than a lawyer who takes on
one matter she is not competent to handle or is tardy in her work. . . . Given the high
value of truth, we might expect that lawyers who lie in court matters will face harsh
sanctions, especially if those lies are under oath. Indeed, lawyers have often been disciplined for lies, whether to tribunals or third persons, but a review of decisions across
more than five years reveals that sanctions are far more lenient in the Second Department than in the First Department—even when the lies are in connection with litigation . . . . Leniency runs deep in Second Department cases that discipline lawyers for
dishonesty in court matters. It has imposed public censure even when lawyers have lied
directly to the courts.
Id.
11
See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Civil Rule 11 and Lawyer Discipline: An Empirical Analysis Suggesting Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 37 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 765, 785-97 (2004) (“Rule 11 Study”).
12
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.

The rule is not intended to chill an attorney’s enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories. The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and
should test the signer’s conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time
the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted. Thus, what constitutes a reasona-
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(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law
or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or,
if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on
the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.13

Rule 11 misconduct encompasses the making of, inter alia, false
statements of law or fact, the obstruction of access to evidence, or equally
serious professional misconduct. Such acts, while not given as specific examples under the rule’s scope, no doubt fall within the bounds of the Rule
11 when done for an “improper purpose,” such as making a claim or defense that is “unwarranted” by existing law or evidence, or false denials of
ble inquiry may depend on such factors as how much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he had to rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper; whether the pleading, motion, or other
paper was based on a plausible view of the law; or whether he depended on forwarding
counsel or another member of the bar.
Id.
13

See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1)-(4). The comparable rule relevant to the case study presented
here is Ill. S. Ct. R. 137(a), which states:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading, motion or other document; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Ill. S. Ct. R. 137(a). In addition, Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(b), provides for sanctions on appeal:
If, after consideration of an appeal or other action pursued in a reviewing court, it is determined that the appeal or other action itself is frivolous, . . . an appropriate sanction
may be imposed upon any party or the attorney or attorneys of the party or parties. An
appeal or other action will be deemed frivolous where it is not reasonably well grounded in fact and not warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.
Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(b).
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factual contentions. But does the fact that there is overlap between Rule 11
misconduct and conduct prohibited by ethics norms mean that lawyer discipline agencies should defer such matters to the courts? Is that what they
do now?
Professor Joy’s Rule 11 Study examined ten years of federal district court (N = 274) and circuit court (N = 437) cases involving Rule 11
sanctions. He coded the cases by court, party sanctioned or exonerated,
frequency of sanctions awarded and denied, and frequencies of circuit court
affirmances and reversals of sanctions.14 Data regarding state civil procedural rules modeled on Rule 11 and referrals to disciplinary agencies was
not within the scope of this study.15
The Rule 11 Study then examined those cases with opinions that
included the words “discipline,” “ethics,” or “refer” (N = 51).16 Of these,
only three specifically involved disciplinary referrals to state lawyer discipline agencies for Rule 11-based misconduct.17 After an examination of
these cases and searching for subsequent state disciplinary agency records
and state supreme court case law, the study noted:
[O]ne cannot say for certain that any of their discipline was
based in whole or in part on the same conduct giving rise
to their Rule 11 sanctions. It is also important to remember that judges could be making private disciplinary referrals, and such referrals would not appear in current case
databases.18
The study concludes that there is “little empirical evidence of a relationship between Rule 11 sanctions and subsequent lawyer discipline.”19
Given this lack of correlation, Professor Joy argues that these data show
that an implicit and appropriate “institutional choice” was made by federal
14
See Joy, supra note 11, at 788. The study does not report separately the cases of circuit
courts imposing their own sanctions. Id.
15
See Joy, supra note 11, at 767 (“It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss discipline
under the state counterparts to Rule 11, or to explore state analogs to other federal laws, rules, and
the inherent power of federal courts to regulate lawyers’ litigation conduct.”). Id.
16
See id. at 792-93. “Because only the public discipline cases appear as reported cases, correlating Rule 11 sanctions that include referrals to disciplinary authorities with resulting discipline captures only the public discipline cases, which comprise slightly less than sixty percent of
all lawyer discipline cases.” Id.
17
See id. at 792.
18
See id. at 795. We know lawyer disciplinary agencies may recommend that a lawyer be
given a private or public censure or reprimand, but it is unclear what Joy means by judges making
“private disciplinary referrals.” Id.
19
See id. at 797. Frankly, a more accurate statement of the results is that no correlation was
found between court sanctions and subsequent disciplinary action. Id.
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judges and state disciplinary agencies to defer Rule 11-type cases to courts
rather than referring the matters to the agencies for possible ethics prosecutions.
The empirical analysis points to an implicit division of authority concerning the regulation of lawyer litigation conduct in federal courts. In this division of authority, federal
district court judges wield primary control over the litigation conduct of lawyers appearing before them. Structural
features of both Rule 11 and prevailing ethics rules, both of
which do not require either judges or lawyers to report
Rule 11 violations to lawyer disciplinary authorities, reinforce this division of authority by virtually guaranteeing
that in most instances the Rule 11 sanctions will be the only public sanctions imposed on lawyers for their litigation
conduct.20
Professor Joy supports his position by citing other commentators’
arguments,21 studies,22 and a bar journal23 finding that disciplinary agencies
are unwilling to control litigation conduct.24 He contends that courts are
more effective at handling litigation conduct, as reflected in the Rule 11
sanctions cases studied.25 Lastly, he notes that the standards for imposing
discipline for litigation misconduct “disfavor lawyer discipline for litigation conduct,”26 and that there is a lack of coordination between courts and
20

See id. at 806 (footnotes omitted).
See Richard H. Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses: Judicial Control of Adversary
Ethic—The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil
Procedure, 56 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 625, 630-31, 642 (1982) (arguing that escalating frivolous litigation and the “perceived inability or reluctance by the bar to police its ranks through disciplinary
actions” served to “encourage the use of rule 11 as a sanctioning mechanism for deterring groundless litigation”).
22
See Jeffrey A. Parness, Disciplinary Referrals Under New Federal Civil Rule 11, 61
TENN. L. REV. 37, 44 (1993) (arguing that only the most serious litigation misconduct should be
referred to lawyer disciplinary agencies and trial judges presiding over cases are better than disciplinary agencies for handling less serious litigation misconduct).
23
See Maridee F. Edwards, Report of the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel for the Year
2002 Together with the Financial Report of the Treasurer of the Advisory Committee Fund for
2002, 59 J. MO. B. 238, 242 (2003) (discussing complaints filed against Missouri lawyers in
2002).
24
See Joy, supra note 11 at 806-08.
25
See id. at 810-11.
26
See id. at 812. For this proposition, Joy argues:
21

The [ABA] Model Rules for Disciplinary Enforcement set forth a category described
as “lesser misconduct,” which is described as “conduct that does not warrant a sanction
restricting the respondent’s license to practice law.” Rather than defining “lesser mis-
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disciplinary agencies, supporting the presence of an implicit institutional
choice of favoring judges over disciplinary agencies in these matters.27
I argue that the institutional choice of deference to courts will effectively immunize many members of the bar from scrutiny for ethics violations arising from their litigation misconduct. That is, miscarriages of
justice will result when a lawyer’s misconduct is not known until after the
litigation is concluded, or where a court exonerates the lawyer under court
rules, and the disciplinary agency thereby declines to investigate the matter.
Professor Joy noted the absence of data of court referrals to disciplinary
agencies, and there is a similar lack of available data regarding cases in
which lawyer discipline agencies defer to courts and decline to investigate
complaints from non-judicial sources, such as aggrieved litigants, opposing
counsel, or non-adversary lawyers who become aware of the misconduct.
III. BACKGROUND TO CASE STUDY
A.

Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission

The Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission
(“ARDC”) is the agency designated by the Illinois Supreme Court to invesconduct,” the rules state that conduct may not be viewed as lesser misconduct if the
conduct involves the “misappropriation of funds,” “results in or is likely to result in
substantial prejudice to a client or other person,” “involves dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or
misrepresentation,” is a serious crime, is the same as conduct for which the respondent
was disciplined within the past five years, or “is part of a pattern of similar misconduct.” Thus, except in extreme cases of Rule 11 violations, or for lawyers who repeatedly violate Rule 11, the disciplinary enforcement rules permit potential ethics violations based on Rule 11 violations to be treated as lesser misconduct that would, if
pursued by disciplinary authorities, not normally result in sanctions restricting the putative lawyer’s right to practice law.
Id. at 812-13 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Also, the ABA Model Standards for Lawyer
Sanctions:
do not usually treat litigation misconduct prohibited by Rule 11 as a serious matter.
The standard describing “abuse of the legal process” mentions the possibility of sanctions for “failure to expedite litigation or bring a meritorious claim.” Examples of sanctions under this standard focus on knowing violations of a court order or rule to gain an
advantage in a matter, or other violations that do not involve violations of Rule 11.
Although it is possible that a Rule 11 sanction may fit the definition of the sanction
standard for abuse of legal process, the Model Standards fail to illustrate this possibility with an example. This failure to discuss or illustrate how Rule 11 conduct may lead
to discipline appears to suggest that disciplinary sanctions for Rule 11 violations are
not a priority under the Model Standards for Lawyer Sanctions.
Id. at 813 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
27
See id. at 813-14.
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tigate and prosecute lawyer discipline cases and make recommendations to
it. The supreme court makes the ultimate decision on discipline cases because it “has the exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law” and
“has the power to impose sanctions for unprofessional conduct so as to protect the public interest and guard the legal profession against reproach.”28
The rules of the Illinois Supreme Court dictate that the ARDC be
comprised of seven members with oversight authority over the disciplinary
process.29 The Commission appoints an Administrator “to serve as the
principal executive officer of the registration and disciplinary system.”30
The Administrator “shall”:
(a) On his own motion, on the recommendation of an Inquiry Board, or at the instance of an aggrieved party, investigate conduct allegations of violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct of attorneys licensed in Illinois . . .
whose conduct tends to defeat the administration of justice
or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute . . . .31
Assuming the ARDC staff attorneys decide the complaint has merit, the prosecution process is as follows: an Inquiry Board is convened to
“inquire into and investigate matters referred to it by the Administrator.
The Board may also initiate investigations on its own motion and may refer
matters to the Administrator for investigation.”32 After investigation and
consideration, the Board “shall dispose of matters before it by voting to
dismiss the charge, to close an investigation, to file a complaint with the
Hearing Board, or to institute unauthorized practice of law proceedings.”33
If the Inquiry Board refers the matter to the Hearing Board, that board
“shall make findings of fact and conclusions of fact and law, together with
a recommendation for discipline, dismissal of the complaint or petition, or
nondisciplinary disposition. The Hearing Board may order that it will ad28
See In re Nesselson, 390 N.E.2d 857, 858 (Ill. 1979) (citing In re Day, 54 N.E. 646, 650
(Ill. 1899)).
29
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 751.
30
See id. at r. 752(a)(1).
31
See id. (emphasis added). Noteworthy is the explicit duty to investigate a complaint
brought “at the instance of an aggrieved party.” While I was not a directly affected “aggrieved
party,” my duty as an Illinois attorney to report the misconduct as described herein was clearly
established under the Himmel case. Infra Part V. In addition, PG, the plaintiff in the case study
described herein, filed his own ARDC complaint on the heels of my filing, to which the ARDC
never responded beyond an initial acknowledgement of receipt. Infra Part V.
32
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 753(a)(2).
33
See id. at para. (a)(3).
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minister a reprimand to the respondent in lieu of recommending disciplinary action by the court.”34 Thereafter, the Review Board
may approve the findings of the Hearing Board, may reject
or modify such findings as it determines are against the
manifest weight of the evidence, may make such additional
findings as are established by clear and convincing evidence, may approve, reject or modify the recommendations, may remand the proceeding for further action or may
dismiss the proceeding. The Review Board may order that
it will administer a reprimand to the respondent in lieu of
recommending disciplinary action by the court.35
Thus, it appears the Hearing and Review Boards may enter “reprimands” to accused lawyers that never reach the supreme court and are publicly inaccessible.
According to the ARDC’s 2020 Annual Report, the bulk of filed
complaints (“grievances”) are client-centered matters:
Grievances that stem from a breakdown in the attorneyclient relationship (neglect of a client’s cause, failure to
communicate, billing and fee issues, and failure to provide
competent representation) are consistently the top areas of
grievance each year and account for 66.4% of all grievances. Neglect of a client’s matter was alleged in 32.1% of all
grievances in 2020.36
In 2020, 3,936 complaints were “investigated.”37 The report shows
that, of all the complaints that were “docketed” in 2020, only fifteen cases
involved false statements: ten of them concerned bar applications or occurred during disciplinary proceedings, and five concerned false statements
about a judge, a judicial candidate, or a public official. None of the complaints docketed involved false statements of law or fact, or concealment of
34

See id. at para. (c)(3).
See id. at para. (d)(3).
36
See MARY F. ANDREONI, ANNUAL REPORT OF 2020, ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND
DISCIPLINARY
COMM’N
5,
36
(2021),
https://www.iardc.org/Files/AnnualReports/AnnualReport2020.pdf.
37
See id. at 20. “1,001 fewer investigations than in 2019; a 20.3% drop from the previous
year and the largest single-year decline.” Id. “The sharp decline in 2020 over 2019 was attributed to the impact of the pandemic[,]” “slowdown of the legal system[,]” the reported five-year decline in the number of new cases filed in Illinois courts, and “a significant rise in the number of
consumers with legal matters who are self-represented, the graying of the legal profession, and
the continuing decline in the Illinois population.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
35
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evidence. However, 231 complaints were docketed involving other litigation misconduct such as filing of frivolous or non-meritorious claims or
pleadings, and 138 involved charges of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, including conduct that is the subject of a contempt finding or court sanction (none of the subcategories of which are specified).
Interestingly, eleven cases were docketed involving failure to report misconduct of a lawyer or judge.38
The report also notes that, in 2020, 4,284 investigations were “concluded,” 4,158 of them by the Administrator’s staff: “1,222 grievances
were closed after initial review of the complainant’s concerns and 2,936
were closed after investigation did not reveal sufficiently serious, provable
misconduct.”39 That left only 126 cases (or 0.03 percent of all complaints
filed that year) that were prosecuted, leaving 4,158 that were dismissed by
ARDC staff attorneys. There are no available data on the nature of these
complaints or reasons for their dismissal.
The prosecuted complaints require evidence of “serious misconduct” and are referred to the Inquiry Board, the first of the three-stage review process.40 Of the 37 cases referred to the Hearing Board in 2020 by
the Inquiry Board, six involved “misrepresentations to a tribunal,” and one
involved “assertion of frivolous pleadings.”41 Once the Hearing Board files
its report in a case, either party may file a notice of exceptions with the Review Board, which serves as an appellate tribunal.42 Seven cases were filed
with the Review Board in 2020, and eleven were “concluded”; however,
the report does not indicate the nature of the cases heard by that board.43
Ultimately, “In 2020, the [Illinois Supreme] Court entered 81 sanctions
against 81 lawyers. The Hearing Board reprimanded one lawyer.”44
In sum, in 2020 only a handful of litigation misconduct cases of
over 4,000 complaints survived the review and investigations conducted by
ARDC staff. Only seven cases heard by the Hearing Board involved litigation misconduct. The ARDC does not report the disposition of all those
cases which resulted in a mere private reprimand.45 Given the paucity of
38

See id. at 48, chart 12.
See id. at 21.
40
See id.
41
See ANDREONI, supra note 36.
42
See id. at 26.
43
See id. at 56, chart 20E.
44
See id. at 27.
45
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 753(d)(3) (“The Review Board may order that it will administer a reprimand to the respondent in lieu of recommending disciplinary action by the court.”); Ill. S. Ct. R.
766(a)(5) (“Proceedings . . . shall be public with the exception of the following matters, which
shall be private and confidential: . . . (5) deliberations of the Hearing Board, the Review Board
and the court.”)
39
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the data, it is unclear whether the ARDC aggressively pursues litigation
misconduct complaints.
B.

Relevant Illinois Supreme Court Opinions
1. Litigation Misconduct and Ethics

The supreme court imposes discipline on lawyers for a variety of
litigation misconduct. The court has considered (but not always imposed)
discipline for lawyers accused of filing frivolous actions.46 This includes
filing frivolous suits without factual or legal basis.47 Filing of frivolous
complaints, failure to make a reasonable inquiry before drafting and filing a
complaint or other document with a tribunal, and other pleading-related actions can also lead to professional discipline.48
The ARDC is a “tribunal” for purposes of Illinois ethics rules, and
frivolous filings with the commission are sanctionable.49 In fact, there are

46
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 137 (permitting court sanctions for frivolous filings); McCarthy v. Taylor,
155 N.E.3d 359, 363-64, (Ill. 2019) (“Rule 137 authorizes a court to impose sanctions against a
party or counsel for filing a motion or pleading that is not well grounded in fact; that is not supported by existing law or lacks a good-faith basis for the modification, reversal, or extension of
the law; or that is interposed for any improper purpose. It is settled that ‘[t]he purpose of Rule
137 is to prevent abuse of the judicial process by penalizing claimants who bring vexatious and
harassing actions.’” (quoting Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 746 N.E. 2d 254, 28586 (2001)). “[T]he predecessor to Rule 137, was to ‘penalize the litigant who pleads frivolous or
false matters, or who brings a suit without any basis in the law’ []. In other words, the clear purpose of Rule 137 is to prevent the filing of false and frivolous lawsuits.” Id. (quoting In re Estate
of Wernick, 535 N.E.2d 876, 883 (Ill. 1989)).
47
See In re Sarelas, 277 N.E.2d 313, 318 (Ill. 1971).

The respondent here has taken out in litigious storm, not only against the judiciary, but
also against fellow lawyers and laymen who have in some manner been connected with
prior disputes wherein he was involved. He has charged them with all manner of fraud
and corruption and with the purpose of maliciously inflicting harm upon him. To borrow from his own complaints, he has made these charges with scurrilous and defamatory invective. He has demonstrated an unfortunate and insistent propensity to sue other
lawyers with whom he has been involved in litigation, as well as members of the judiciary who have rendered judgments against him or his clients. He has consistently exercised this propensity with unprofessional and contemptuous language.
Id.; see also In re Jafree, 444 N.E.2d 143, 149 (Ill. 1982) (explaining that respondent instituted
numerous defamatory and frivolous lawsuits, appeals and administrative actions).
48
See In re Mitan, 518 N.E.2d 1000, 1008 (Ill. 1987). The test for such misconduct is whether “no objectively reasonable inquiry was made into the pertinent facts and law” before filing the
document with a tribunal, in this case, a verified reinstatement petition to the ARDC. Id.
49
See In re Smith, 659 N.E.2d 896, 908 (Ill. 1995) (“[P]rior to the hearing, respondent repeatedly filed frivolous requests and meritless motions which appear solely calculated to delay
the proceedings.” (quoting In re Samuels, 535 N.E.2d 808, 817 (Ill. 1989)).
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numerous cases in the supreme court’s jurisprudence addressing false
statements made to that tribunal as part of the lawyer discipline process.
This conduct is a separate ethics violation from breaches of candortowards-the-tribunal requirements.50
The few Illinois Supreme Court cases involving false statements to
courts imposed discipline for the filing of factually false documents. Examples include: the filing of a false pauper affidavit;51 the filing of a false
affidavit submitted to another state supreme court that failed to disclose
that the lawyer was admitted to practice law in Illinois;52 the failure to disclose in a pro hac vice application to a federal court that the lawyer was
previously disciplined by another court;53 the unauthorized filing of a factually false pauper affidavit in the bankruptcy court;54 the filing of a false and
misleading final account of an estate in probate;55 and the like.56 Research
discloses no Illinois Supreme Court cases involving discipline of lawyers
for making a false statement of law to a tribunal, nor the withholding of
material evidence.
2. ARDC Independence
In theory, the ARDC maintains its independence from courts to
carry out its purpose of determining lawyers’ fitness to practice law by applying the state’s Rules of Professional Conduct. The Illinois Supreme
50
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 8.1(b) cmt. (1) (“[I]t is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to
knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation
of the lawyer’s own conduct.”); In re Timpone, 804 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ill. 2004); see also In re
McAuliffe, 506 N.E.2d 1300, 1300 (Ill. 1987).
51
See In re Ingersoll, 710 N.E.2d 390, 392 (Ill. 1999).

The charges concerned respondent’s role in the preparation and filing of a pauper’s affidavit Flexner filed in circuit court in connection with the slander suit. The form, entitled ‘Application to Sue or Defend as a Poor Person,’ sought information on the applicant’s financial standing. Question 4, regarding real and personal property, stated,
‘Applicant owns (A) no real estate except: (Location and Value),’ and was followed by
a blank line on which the applicant could provide information regarding his interests in
real estate. Flexner’s application did not contain any answer for question 4A. Flexner,
however, owned a home in Morton, where he lived with his wife and three sons.
Id.
52

See In re Bell, 588 N.E.2d 1093, 1096 (Ill. 1992).
See In re Howard, 721 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (Ill. 1999).
54
See In re Lewis, 562 N.E.2d 198, 206 (Ill. 1990).
55
See In re Gordon, 524 N.E.2d 547, 549-50 (Ill. 1988).
56
See In re Mehta, 413 N.E.2d 1265, 1265-66 (Ill. 1980) (ordering respondent be suspended
for three years for filing false statements in connection with immigration cases); In re Mitan, 387
N.E.2d 278, 282 (Ill. 1978) (ordering respondent be disbarred for making false statements on application for admission to the bar).
53
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Court has held that trial court rulings are a factor to be considered in the
disciplinary process but are not binding on the Hearing Board (where the
evidentiary discipline hearing takes place).57 Criminal court judgments are
similarly non-binding in the disciplinary process.58
In re Ettinger involved a lawyer charged criminally in federal court
with a scheme to bribe a police officer.59 He was acquitted by a jury, but
the ARDC thereafter pursued multiple ethics violations against him.60 In
response to his claim that his acquittal precluded an ARDC prosecution, the
court stated:
Illinois, along with the majority of other States, has adopted the position that an acquittal in a criminal proceeding
against an attorney will not act as a bar to subsequent disciplinary proceedings based upon substantially the same
conduct . . . . The rationale underlying this rule is the differing purposes of criminal as opposed to disciplinary proceedings. While the purpose of a criminal prosecution is to
punish the wrongdoer, the purpose of a disciplinary proceeding is to determine whether an individual is a proper
person to be permitted to practice law.61

57

See In re Owens, 581 N.E.2d 633, 636 (Ill. 1991) (“Although a civil judgment may not be
the only factor of consideration of a Hearing Board, it nevertheless may be a component in the
greater whole of the Board’s decision.”) ARDC Hearing Boards publish their own opinions and
follow this rule. See In re Stolfo, No. 2742217, 2018 WL 2123647, at *3 (Ill. Atty. Reg. Disp.
Comm. Apr. 16, 2018).
Findings in related civil proceedings are not binding or dispositive in disciplinary matters, although those findings can be considered, along with the other evidence presented, in determining whether the Administrator has met his burden of proving the misconduct charged. The Hearing Panel may not find misconduct based solely on a
decision in a civil case, but may consider the record and rulings in an underlying civil
case, as part of the evidence and part of the basis for its decision. We considered the
evidence in this case as a whole, mindful of these principles.
Id. (citations omitted).
58
See In re Ettinger, 538 N.E.2d 1152, 1160 (Ill. 1989).
59
See id. at 1153.
60
See id. at 1155. The one-count complaint contained the following alleged rule violations
(under a previous ethics code): Rule 1–102(a)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral
turpitude); Rule 1–102(a)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation); Rule 1–102(a)(5) (engaging in conduct which is prejudicial to the administration of
justice); Rule 7–102(a)(5) (knowingly making a false statement of law or fact); Rule 7–102(a)(6)
(participating in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or when it is obvious
that the evidence is false); and Rule 7–102(a)(7) (counseling or assisting his client in conduct that
the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent). Id. at 1115.
61
See id. at 1160-61. The court added:
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Despite this distinction, the ARDC does not always invoke the independence the state supreme court declares it has.
IV. STANDARDS GOVERNING LAWYER DISCIPLINE
A.

Restatement Rules and Procedural Guidance

The Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers offers guidance regarding attorney discipline proceedings.62 It provides that “[A] professional, independent disciplinary counsel is charged with responsibility to prosecute offenses, often following review by a screening body to determine
whether probable cause exists warranting formal charges.”63 The standard
of proof in most jurisdictions, including the ARDC, is clear and convincing
evidence; “that is, evidence establishing the truth of the charged offense
beyond a mere preponderance of the evidence but not necessarily beyond a
reasonable doubt.”64 Lawyers are subject to discipline for violating any
provision of an applicable lawyer code of ethics, as well as “for attempting
to commit a violation.”65 Fellow lawyers “who know of another lawyer’s
violation of applicable rules of professional conduct raising a substantial
question of the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness or the lawyer’s fitness
as a lawyer in some other respect must report that information to appropri-

Thus, a disciplinary proceeding seeks to protect the public and monitor the legal profession. Additionally, the burden of proof in the two proceedings is different. In a criminal prosecution, charges must be established beyond a reasonable doubt; in a disciplinary proceeding, charges need be proved by clear and convincing evidence. In this
respect, evidence deemed insufficient to convict an attorney on criminal charges may
be sufficient to show a deviation from required standards of professional conduct, warranting disciplinary action. Respondent’s acquittal in the Federal district court has no
bearing upon the professional misconduct alleged. . . . More importantly, however, as
we have already discussed, respondent’s acquittal in a criminal case has little effect
upon these proceedings. Disciplinary proceedings serve a different purpose and are
governed by different rules. The respondent has been charged with different wrongs.
Thus, even if respondent could convince us that he withdrew from the bribery scheme,
this would not alleviate the professional errors he engaged in.
Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Browning, 179 N.E.2d 14, 17-19 (Ill. 1961); Robert Brazener, Annotation, Effect of Acquittal or Dismissal in Criminal Prosecution as Barring Disciplinary Action Against Attorney, 76 A.L.R.3d 1028 § 2[b] (1977) (“[There is] little doubt but that an
acquittal of an attorney in a criminal proceeding will not bar disciplinary action against the attorney arising out of the same facts.”)
62
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (AM. L. INST. 2000).
63
See id. § 4.
64
See id.
65
See id. § 5(2).
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ate disciplinary authorities.”66 Regarding the accused lawyer’s state of
mind, “[m]ost disciplinary offenses involve acts that, in themselves, reflect
a concern with moral blameworthiness and thus require that the lawyer’s
conduct be knowing . . . . What a lawyer knows may be inferred from the
circumstances. Accordingly, a finding of knowledge does not require that
the lawyer confess to or otherwise admit the state of mind required for the
offense.”67
Section 106, Comment [d] notes that “opposing advocates should
bear toward each other “a respectful and cooperative attitude marked by civility, consistent with their primary responsibilities to their clients.”68
Comment [d] also prohibits “charges of wrongdoing made recklessly or
knowing them to be without foundation,” “legally impermissible forms of
partisanship,” and “misrepresenting the record.”69 Regarding sanctions petitions, the Restatement cites authority for the proposition that the filing of
frivolous motions for sanctions against an opponent may itself incur sanctions, and result in discipline under ABA Model Rule 3.1, which has been
adopted in Illinois.70
Lawyers under the Restatement “may not knowingly: (1) make a
false statement of a material proposition of law to the tribunal; or (2) fail to
disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known
to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position asserted by the client
and not disclosed to opposing counsel.”71 Comment [b] to this rule states
that the rule also prohibits a lawyer from “making an apparently complete
recital of relevant authorities but omitting an adverse decision that should
be considered by the tribunal for a fair determination of the point.”72 Similarly, Restatement § 118 states that a lawyer “may not falsify documentary
or other evidence, and “may not destroy or obstruct another party’s access
to documentary or other evidence when doing so would violate a court order or other legal requirements . . .”73 The “evidence” includes materials
66

See id. § 5(3).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. (d) (AM. L.
INST. 2000). The Restatement cites, inter alia, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Terminology, ¶¶ [1], [5], and [9] (1983) (citing definitions of “belief,” “knowingly,” and “reasonably
should know.”) Id. Reporter’s Note, cmt. (d).
68
See id. § 106 cmt (d).
69
See id. The section does permit a lawyer to make a “vigorous argument and to attack an
opposing position on all legal available grounds.” Id.
70
See id. § 166 Reporter’s Note cmt. (d) (citing Hauswald Bakery v. Pantry Pride Enters.,
Inc., 553 A.2d 1308, 1314, n. 3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)).
71
See id. § 111.
72
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111 cmt. (b) (AM. L.
INST. 2000) (emphasis added).
73
See id. § 118 (1)-(2).
67
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“that a reasonable lawyer would understand may be relevant to an official
proceeding.”74 The Restatement also prohibits a lawyer from “allud[ing] to
any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that
will not be supported by admissible evidence.”75 This includes the prohibition against “‘backdoor’ methods of proof of an inadmissible matter.”76
As noted earlier, the most apt statement in the Restatement is the
acknowledgement that most lawyer disciplinary agencies rely on the courts
to deal with litigation abuses.77
B.

ABA Guidance on Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement

The ABA publishes the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (“MRDE”), which provide guidance to regulatory bodies for
processing lawyer misconduct complaints.78 The ARDC has its own rules,79
which will be compared to the ABA procedural rules. MRDE Rule 4 defines the duties of disciplinary counsel. These include the power and duty
“[t]o investigate all information coming to the attention of the agency
which, if true, would be grounds for discipline . . .”80 Counsel also has the
power to “dismiss or recommend probation, informal admonition, a stay,
the filing of formal charges” or to transfer a lawyer to inactive status.81
Despite the supreme court rule stating that the ARDC Administrator “shall” investigate allegations of lawyer misconduct, the ARDC’s Rule
51 states that the Administrator “may” initiate an investigation on his own
motion based upon information from any source. ARDC Rule 52 provides,
in relevant part, that “the Administrator is not required to investigate any
charge which does not meet the requirements of this rule, although in his
discretion he may do so.” The only “requirements” of that rule are that the

74

See id. § 118 cmt. (a).
See id. § 107(2).
76
See id. § 107 cmt. (c).
77
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 cmt. (b) (AM. L.
INST. 2000) (prohibiting “[f]rivolous [a]dvocacy”). The definition of a “frivolous position” is
“one that a lawyer of ordinary competence would recognize as so lacking in merit that there is no
substantial possibility that the tribunal would accept it.” Id. Whereas a nonfrivolous argument is
one that “includes a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law.” Id. at cmt. (d).
78
See MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2007).
79
See Ill. R. of the Att’y Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n (2021) (“ARDC Rules”),
https://iardc.org/Home/Rules. The previous iteration of the rules, dated December 7, 2011, were
not posted on the ARDC website.
80
See MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT r. 4(B)(2) (AM. BAR. ASS’N
2007) (emphasis added).
81
See id. at (B)(3).
75
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charge be in writing, and “shall identify the respondent and the person
making the charge, and shall be sufficiently clear to apprise the respondent
of the misconduct or unauthorized practice charged.” The ARDC initiation-of-investigation rule appears to be narrower than the ABA rule; the latter requires that “all information” regarding lawyer misconduct be investigated, while the former states that the Administrator “may” in his or her
discretion investigate complaints received.
MRDE Rule 11 further provides that disciplinary counsel “shall
evaluate all information coming to his or her attention by complaint or
from other sources alleging misconduct . . .”82 If the lawyer is subject to
the jurisdiction of the court, “and the information alleges facts which, if
true, would constitute misconduct or incapacity, disciplinary counsel shall
conduct an investigation.”83 Upon conclusion of an investigation, disciplinary counsel may dismiss the case or recommend formal charges.84
ARDC Rule 54 provides that the Administrator “shall close an investigation . . . upon the Administrator’s conclusion that there is insufficient evidence to establish that the respondent has engaged in misconduct”
or an unauthorized practice violation. The rule further provides that the
Administrator’s closure decision “shall not bar the Administrator from resuming the investigation if circumstances warrant.”
MRDE Rule 11 states that, upon conclusion of an investigation, the
complainant “shall be notified of the disposition of a matter following investigation.” ARDC Rule 54 also provides that, in the case of closure,
“[t]he Administrator shall notify the complaining witness of the decision to
close an investigation.” Disciplinary counsel’s duties under the ABA rules
also include the requirement “[t]o notify promptly the complainant and the
respondent of the status and the disposition of each matter,” and to, inter
alia, provide “to the complainant” the following: (a) a copy of any notice,
motion, or order sent to respondent; (b) a copy of any written communication from the respondent relating to the matter, except privileged material;
(c) a concise written statement of the facts and reasons a matter has been
dismissed prior to a hearing, and a copy of the relevant guidelines for dismissal, “provided that the complainant shall be given a reasonable opportunity to rebut statements of the respondent before the case is dismissed.”
No such requirements exist under ARDC rules. There is also no right to
rebut the closure rationale.
Interestingly, a complainant under MRDE Rule 11 “may file a
written request for review of counsel’s dismissal decision within [thirty]
82
83
84

See id. at r. 11(A).
See id. (emphasis added).
See id. at (A)(1)(a)-(c).
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days of receipt of notice of disposition[.]”85 The request for review of disciplinary counsel’s dismissal decision “shall be reviewed by the chair upon
the complainant’s request for review.”86 There is no parallel provision in
the ARDC rules, which deprives complainants of all recourse once a closure decision is made.
The MRDE provides that rules are needed “to determine which
matters should be dismissed for failing to allege facts that, if true, would
constitute grounds for disciplinary action.”87 The case described below is
an example of the need to have very specific dismissal rules. Dismissal
rules would place an affirmative burden on the ARDC to make findings
even in cases where the alleged acts occurred in courts that chose not to
sanction the behavior. Members of the public, according to the MRDE,
“who come to the agency seeking its services are entitled to be advised of
the disposition of their complaints.”88 This guideline also exists in ARDC
Rule 54.
Another interesting provision in the MRDE pertains to situations
where a complaint is filed against, inter alia, “a member of a hearing committee.”89 In that event, the chair of the board “shall appoint a special hearing committee for the case.”90 No such parallel procedure exists under the
ARDC rules. ARDC counsel merely refers the matter involving one of the
agency’s own Hearing Board members to Special Counsel, who subsequently decides whether to recommend an investigation.
V. THE HIMMEL COMPLAINT
Lawyers in Illinois have a duty to report fellow lawyers’ misconduct to the ARDC. In re Himmel91 is an Illinois Supreme Court disciplinary case on point.92 Here, the respondent lawyer was retained to compel
85

See MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT r. 11(B)(3) (AM. BAR. ASS’N

2007).
86
87
88
89
90

See id.
See id. at r. 4(B)(7).
See id. at r. 4 cmt.
See id. at r. 18(K).
See MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT r. 18(K)(2) (AM. BAR. ASS’N

2007).
91
92

533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988).
See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 793-94 (Ill. 1988).

This court has also emphasized the importance of a lawyer’s duty to report misconduct . . . . [‘A] lawyer has the duty to report the misconduct of other lawyers. Petitioner’s belief in a code of silence indicates to us that he is not at present fully rehabilitated
or fit to practice law.’ Thus, if the present respondent’s conduct did violate the rule on
reporting misconduct, imposition of discipline for such a breach of duty is mandated.
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another lawyer to pay their mutual client the latter’s share of an accident
settlement that he never paid.93 This was because the second lawyer had
converted the client’s funds.94 Rather than reporting the misconduct, the respondent lawyer entered into a contract with the offending lawyer, agreeing
to a settlement in exchange for his agreement not to report the other lawyer’s misconduct to the ARDC, nor file a civil or criminal complaint
against him.95
The supreme court held that respondent’s failure to report the misconduct of the lawyer who converted client funds was itself an ethical violation, rejecting his defense that his acts were not taken for financial gain,
but rather for his client’s benefit.96 The applicable disciplinary rule at the
time was Rule 1–103(a) of the lawyer ethics code, which stated: “A lawyer
possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of Rule 1–102(a)(3) or
(4) shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered
to investigate or act upon such violation.”97 Rule 1–102 of the code stated:
(a) A lawyer shall not
(1) violate a disciplinary rule;
(2) circumvent a disciplinary rule through actions of another;
(3) engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude;
(4) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; or
Id. (citations omitted). This case was “the first reported decision imposing discipline solely for
an attorney’s failure to report collegial misconduct.” DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN,
LEGAL ETHICS 853 (1995); see also DEBORAH RHODE & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 237 (2002) (noting that “Illinois is the only
jurisdiction that has made (if sporadic) attempts to enforce reporting requirements,” and that
Himmel “is the first published decision imposing discipline solely for a lawyer’s failure to report
collegial misconduct.”)
93
See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 791.
94
See id.
95
See id.
96
See id at 794.
Though respondent repeatedly asserts that his failure to report was motivated not by financial gain but by the request of his client, we do not deem such an argument relevant
in this case. This court has stated that discipline may be appropriate even if no dishonest motive for the misconduct exists. In addition, we have held that client approval of
an attorney’s action does not immunize an attorney from disciplinary action. We have
already dealt with, and dismissed, respondent’s assertion that his conduct is acceptable
because he was acting pursuant to his client’s directions.
Id. (citations omitted).
97
See 107 Ill.2d r. 1–103(a).
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(5) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.98

Today, Mr. Himmel’s acts would constitute a violation of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (“IRPC”), namely, Rule 8.3, Reporting
Professional Misconduct: “A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has
committed a violation of Rule 8.4(b) or Rule 8.4(c) shall inform the appropriate professional authority.” The latter paragraphs of IRPC 8.4 prohibit
acts that reflect adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer, and conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.99 MRPC 8.3 (Reporting Professional Misconduct) contains
different language: “A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”
After reading the entire record of the case noted below, I suspected
that the two attorneys involved had engaged in professional misconduct.
As such, I had an ethical obligation to report it. I did so in a twenty-ninepage complaint.

98

See 107 Ill.2d r. 1–102.
See Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4(b)-(c) (effective Jan. 1, 2010). An article on the ARDC’s
web site by their senior counsel for ethics education explains the duty to report another lawyer’s
misconduct, and makes multiple relevant points. Mary Andreoni, Senior Ethics Education Counsel, Answering the Top 10 Questions About a Lawyer’s Duty to Report Misconduct,
https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/News/993/Answering-the-Top-10-Questions-About-a-LawyersDuty-to-Report-Misconduct/news-detail/. First, “[r]eporting can be awkward and uncomfortable,
but most lawyers recognize that the duty to report fulfills our collective responsibility to maintain
the public’s confidence in the integrity of the justice system and legal profession.” Id. Second,
“[t]he three elements triggering a required duty to report another lawyer under ILRPC 8.3(a) are:
(1) that a lawyer ‘knows’ of another lawyer’s conduct; (2) involving a violation of ILRPC 8.4(b)
(criminal acts that reflect adversely on the trustworthiness, honesty or fitness as a lawyer) or
ILRPC 8.4(c) (fraudulent or deceitful conduct); and (3) where that knowledge is not otherwise
protected by the attorney-client privilege or by law.” Id. Lastly, “[t]he duty to report is ‘absolute’ and a lawyer cannot be prevented or excused from discharging this duty by a court, a client
(unless the lawyer’s knowledge is based on attorney-client privilege), by a report already made by
the client or someone else or even if the information about the misconduct has become ‘common
knowledge.’” Id. (first citing Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 730 N.Ed.2d 4, 15 (Ill. 2000); and
then citing In re Daley, M.R. 17023, 98SH2 (IL Nov. 27, 2000)). In In re Daley, the “Hearing
and Review Boards rejected lawyer’s argument that he was relieved of the duty to report because
the other lawyer’s conduct had been disclosed in a court proceeding, was widely disseminated in
the press, and was disclosed to various law enforcement agencies.” Id. (citing In re Daley, M.R.
17023, 98SH2 (IL Nov. 27, 2000)).
99
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Allegations

PG filed a complaint for monetary relief in an Illinois small claims
court.100 He filed his pro se complaint in six counts. I read the record in
this case and filed the aforementioned Himmel complaint against the two
lawyers for the defense. In brief, my complaint made the following allegations: (1) the lawyers made a false statement of law when they denied the
existence of a relevant statutory section that their pro se adversary relied
upon and was detrimental to their case (a conflict which the court failed to
resolve through research, accepting the lawyers’ misrepresentation as to the
law); (2) the lawyers made false statements of fact regarding PG’s character, calling him a vexatious pro se litigant whose claims were merely a matter of “personal opinion,” and whose case was “baseless” and “frivolous”;
(3) the lawyers obstructed the pro se litigant’s access to evidence; and (4)
the lawyers filed an unwarranted sanctionable sanctions petition against
PG.
B.

Rationales for Dismissal of Complaint Without Investigation

Along with the Himmel complaint, I sent a voluminous package to
the ARDC containing the entire record in the aforementioned case, including pleadings, motions, orders, transcripts of motion hearings, the trial, and
the sanctions hearings, the appellate decision affirming the trial court and
its modified opinion on rehearing, plus briefs filed in the appellate and supreme courts.101 The ARDC senior counsel acknowledged receipt of my
complaint, and advised that, because one of the accused lawyers was a
member of the ARDC’s Hearing Board (the second of three bodies that review ARDC complaints), the ARDC was referring the matter to special
counsel for review and recommendation.

100
For confidentiality purposes, I am not providing the full name of the plaintiff, the accused
lawyers, the trial judge, the circuit court in which this arose, or the appellate court that affirmed
the trial court’s decision. All transcripts, pleadings, briefs, court orders, and appellate opinions
are on file with the author, and have been provided to and verified by this Journal. The Supreme
Court of Illinois moved the case to a “confidential” docket at the request of the ARDC; see also,
Jona Goldschmidt, Equal Injustice for All: High Quality Self-Representation Does Not Ensure a
Matter is “Fairly Heard,” 44.2 SEATTLE L. REV. SUPRA 75, 86-88 (2021) (citing this case study
and two others in support of the proposition that high-functioning “expert” pro se litigants are still
subject to experiencing miscarriages of justice).
101
For his appeal, PG submitted the entire trial court record, which was Bates stamped. The
Himmel complaint made references to this record by page number for each allegation of the complaint.
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1. Deference to Courts

Senior ARDC counsel’s initial response to the Himmel complaint
raised two interesting issues. She wrote that: “The ARDC does not review
and cannot nullify court decisions or orders.”102 She, however, misconstrued the complaint as being one seeking to overturn a judgment or order.
My complaint asked the ARDC to “review” the record for ethical misconduct, but not to “nullify,” the court proceedings as such.
Counsel’s position that the ARDC cannot “review” court proceedings in a disciplinary case appears to state a general policy of deference to
courts in litigation misconduct cases. One wonders what circumstances
would justify the ARDC “reviewing” court records, not for nullification-ofcourt-order purposes, but for investigation of candor-toward-the-tribunal
complaints. The ARDC’s position on this point appears to be that their
hands are tied; they must respect court rulings. This may sound reasonable
in theory, but how would lawyers engaging in breaches of the duty of candor to the tribunal ever be disciplined, particularly in cases in which their
side prevails? Or, where a judge has acted unethically, enabling the offending lawyer’s misconduct to be overlooked? In such cases the offending
lawyers may never be held accountable.
Professor Rhode observes that disciplinary agencies often refer
cases involving litigation misconduct back to the courts.103 Here, the
ARDC did not refer the matter back to the courts, and took no steps to
bring the matter to the trial, appellate, or supreme court’s attention. As
such, the agency forfeited its power to investigate a lawyer-filed complaint,
which could have led to an opportunity to enforce the Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct and hold lawyers accountable for litigation
misconduct.104

102
Letter from Althea K. Welsh, Senior Counsel, ARDC, to author (March 30, 2017) (on file
with author).
103
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
104
At the end of my Himmel complaint I suggested that, if the complaint were sustained, the
attorneys’ fees awarded to the lawyers by the trial and appellate courts should be disgorged, since
they were the product of a fraud upon the court through misrepresentations of law and fact, and
by the lawyers’ withholding of, or obstruction to, critical evidence. In response, senior disciplinary counsel wrote: “Additionally, there is no legal authority for making disgorgement of fees
and costs paid as court-ordered sanctions part of a lawyer disciplinary sanction.”
ARDC counsel apparently interpreted S. Ct. R. 772(b)(5), authorizing “restitution” as one of
the possible conditions of disciplinary probation, as having no application to disgorgement of
sanctions by a court as a result of their unethical conduct. But, she never explained why a trial or
appellate court would object to a Supreme Court-ordered sanctions restitution, recommended by
its own lawyer discipline agency, and which was the product of unethical conduct. The specific
issue is, however, addressed in disciplinary enforcement guidance.
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In her decision letter declining to investigate the complaint, ARDC
counsel wrote:
[I]t is not unusual for parties and representatives to maintain that opposing lawyers in court proceedings have made
false claims and statements. This circumstance does not in
itself justify a disciplinary investigation into the professional conduct of the opposing lawyers. Issues regarding
the truth and validity of factual and legal claims made in
court proceedings are appropriately addressed and resolved
in the courts rather than through the lawyer disciplinary
process.”105
This statement implies that there are no circumstances under which
a false statement of law or fact made to a tribunal during litigation may be
examined by the ARDC. This is a startling proposition, and, if true, completely abrogates de facto the professional responsibility of candor toward a
tribunal. This will allow lawyers who engage in such misconduct to avoid

According to the Restatement, the traditional sanctions imposed upon lawyers found guilty of
professional misconduct include impediments to the lawyer’s right to practice and other sanctions
such as, most relevant here, “ordering restitution.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS Title C, Introductory Note (AM. L. INST. 2000). The ABA Model Rules
state otherwise. Rule 10 specifically provides that, among the other well-known sanctions of disbarment, suspension, probation, reprimand, or admonition, the supreme court or disciplinary
agency may order “restitution to persons financially injured, disgorgement of all or part of the
lawyer’s or law firm’s fee . . .” MODEL RULES OF PRO. RESP. CONDUCT r. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2020). Unlike a financial sanction by way of a fine (opponents of which argue it constitutes punishment and not public protection and where a double jeopardy argument could be made), RHODE
& HAZARD, supra note 7, at 244-45, restitution to a victim of professional misconduct has multiple purposes: compensation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, all of which further public protection.
Interestingly, Rhode and Hazard suggest that with the imposition of fines (which they note lawyer
discipline agencies generally do not allow), “more of those victims might report misconduct and
feel fairly treated by the disciplinary process.” RHODE & HAZARD, supra note 7, at 245.
Admittedly, these provisions contemplate a sustained complaint involving improper retention
or theft of client funds, rather than being a recipient of unwarranted court-ordered sanctions. Yet,
both consist of attorneys’ fees improperly and unethically received. Whether fees are unethically
retained versus a product of unethical conduct is a distinction without a difference. Comparatively, court-awarded sanctions earned unethically should be considered a much more serious breach
of professional responsibility; fees stolen from a client should not be given preference over fees
stolen from an adverse party through chicanery in litigation (i.e., through official corruption and
betrayal of the public trust).
This again raises the issue of whether court-ordered sanctions that are based on a lawyer’s
misrepresentation of law or facts can ever be remedied. It brings us to senior counsel’s next observation regarding the ARDC’s inability to review court proceedings.
105
Letter from Althea K. Welsh, Senior Counsel, ARDC, to author (August 31, 2017) (on
file with author).
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sanctions in that category of cases where the court is unaware of the
misconduct during the pendency of the case.
2. Mere “Argumentation, Characterization, or Conclusion”
In her decision letter, ARDC counsel stated: “We observe that
many of the statements you allege constituted misrepresentations by [the
lawyers] were in the nature of argument, characterizations or conclusions.”106 Here, it appears she is arguing that one should expect such conduct in litigation given its rough-and-tumble nature. Additionally, ARDC
counsel failed to identify which statements were in the nature of argument,
characterizations, or conclusions. One would assume that any lawyer who
submits a complaint against a non-adversary lawyer based on alleged false
statements of law and fact is entitled to know the basis for the ARDC’s
prosecutorial decision regarding each allegation.
Second, although ARDC’s counsel claimed that some of the
alleged misrepresentations were part of the lawyers’ arguments,
characterizations, and conclusions, they rested upon alleged falsehoods
about the law and the facts of the case. Here, again, the implication of the
ARDC’s position is that when attorneys make arguments, characterizations,
or conclusions, it will not scrutinize the facts or law on which they base
those statements. This position taken by the ARDC runs counter to the
stated principles of both the MRPC and the IRPC, which forbid the making
of false statements of law or fact to a tribunal.
3. Likelihood of Meeting Clear and Convincing Burden
ARDC counsel also wrote:
We would not be able to prove that such statements constituted factual misrepresentations. We have concluded that
any effort to bring formal disciplinary charges against [the
lawyers] based on your allegations would not be successful
and would not result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. Accordingly, the ARDC will take no further action
with respect to your request.107

106
107

See id. (emphasis added).
See id.
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Nothing in the first sentence quoted speaks to the false statement of
law; it only refers to false statements of fact, despite the complaint raising
both issues.108
In a later letter, ARDC counsel wrote:
Our decisions regarding whether to pursue disciplinary
charges against lawyers based on alleged rule violations
are made on a case-by-case basis and are generally the
product of a confluence of factors, including our interpretation of applicable rules of professional conduct, our analysis of available information and evidence, our assessment
of potential harm to the public and to the administration of
justice, or policies relating to non-interference with the judicial process and respect for court decisions, and our
judgment on the appropriate use of our limited resources.109
The ARDC’s refusal to investigate the complaint did not indicate
any differences in rule interpretation; my complaint did not cite to any specific rules on the assumption that it is the province of the ARDC to make
its own judgments regarding which, if any, ethics rules were violated. It
appears that the “analysis of available information and evidence” was not
even conducted. Nor does it appear that an “assessment of potential harm
to the public or the administration of justice” was conducted. Most telling
is ARDC counsel’s adherence to its inexplicable hands-off policy regarding
review of court records to determine whether professional responsibility
rule violations occurred, as reflected in the italicized language in the quotation above.
Subsequently, I requested that the Illinois Supreme Court order the
ARDC to investigate my complaint. I did this first through two attempted
amicus curiae filings during the pendency of PG’s petition for leave to appeal to the state supreme court, wherein I attempted to bring to the alleged
miscarriage of justice to the court’s attention. Both amicus filings were rejected because the supreme court only allows amicus brief filings when a
petition for leave to appeal has been granted (and PG’s was not). In addition, I asked the same court to enter a supervisory order directing the
ARDC to investigate the complaint, but this too was denied without opin108
As to whether the ARDC could prove its case, the pleadings and transcripts to which reference was made in the Himmel complaint (by document or transcript page numbers) for each and
every allegation of misconduct, clearly evidenced the misstatements of law and fact. Here, too,
one wonders what else the ARDC needs to prove its case under these circumstances.
109
See Letter from Althea K. Welsh, Senior Counsel, ARDC, to author (September 8, 2017)
(on file with author).
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ion after the matter was moved to the “Confidential Docket” of the court on
the ARDC’s motion.
VI. NATIONAL SURVEY OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE AGENCIES
A.

Method

The case study described above led me to inquire of all states’, the
District of Columbia, and the U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) policies for handling complaints received regarding litigation misconduct. The
survey letter asked disciplinary counsel for their response to the following
hypothetical:
It is the hypothetical case of a lawyer who intentionally
makes a false statement of fact or law in litigation and is
not sanctioned by the court. The failure to sanction could
be because the matter was undetected by the adverse party,
or the court considered the matter but determined that the
lawyer had not violated the relevant statute or court rule
(or was found not to be in contempt). But the adverse party—believing the lawyer acted unethically—thereafter files
a disciplinary complaint against the lawyer.
Does your agency have a general policy to (a) decline to
investigate such allegations because the court did not rule
on it, or because of the court’s ruling exonerated the lawyer? or (b) does your agency nevertheless investigate the
allegation in the context of professional ethics norms?
After excluding the responses from several agencies indicating that
they do not respond to hypotheticals, I received valid responses from twenty-nine disciplinary counsel.
B.

Results

The hypothetical posed three scenarios: (1) the court failed to address the alleged misconduct; (2) the court addressed the alleged misconduct and imposed sanctions; and (3) the court denied sanctions against
(“exonerated”) the lawyer after considering the sanctions request. In analyzing the responses, the following issues arose.
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1. Policies Regarding Investigations
The responses of disciplinary counsel were grouped into the categories of “Yes – would investigate,” “No - wouldn’t investigate,” and
“Other.” Nineteen counsels’ responses fell into the “Yes – would investigate” category; none fell into the “No – wouldn’t investigate” category; and
ten fell into the “Other” category. Counsel sorted into the “Other” category
all stated their concern about the likelihood of a successful prosecution
where a court exonerates the accused lawyer, given the agencies’ “clear
and convincing” burden of proof. Arguably, these ten cases could be included in the “Yes – would investigate” category because these respondents stated they would nevertheless independently review or investigate the
complaint.
Viewed in this light, the responses appear unanimous. Counsel all
indicated that they did not have a prosecution policy for the scenarios presented. As one respondent succinctly put it, Florida “does not have a general policy wherein we decline to investigate allegations because there is no
court order or because the court did not sanction an attorney.”110 The agencies universally consider each complaint on a case-by-case basis. As counsel noted: “the Disciplinary Commission would look at these allegations on
a case-by-case basis to determine whether reasonable cause exists to pursue
formal disciplinary action”111
Therefore, without exception, but with some qualifications noted
below, these twenty-nine disciplinary counsel would not be deterred from
pursuing an investigation under any of the scenarios presented.
2. Defining “Investigation”
Another interesting issue arising from the survey is counsels’ distinction between a “review” and an “investigation” of litigation misconduct
cases. Counsel, of course, must possess evidence establishing a reasonable
likelihood or probable cause of an ethics violation before sending the case
to the first hearing stage of the process. As one counsel put it, “Ultimately,
what matters is whether the State Bar can sustain the facts that establish the
violation.”112
110

See E-mail from Allison C. Sackett, Div. Legal Div. Dir., The Fla. Bar, to author (March
26, 2021, 04:05 CST) (on file with author).
111
See Letter from Charles M. Kidd, Deputy Exec. Dir., Disciplinary Comm’n, Ind. Sup. Ct.
Off. Of Jud. Admin., to author (May 13, 2021) (on file with author).
112
See E-mail from James S. Lewis, Assistant Gen. Couns., State Bar of Ga., to author (July
13, 2021, 11:58 CST) (on file with author); see also Letter from Alan D. Pratzel, Chief Disciplinary Couns., Off. Of Disciplinary Couns., Sup. Ct. of Mo., to author (July 8, 2021) (on file with
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Before a formal complaint is lodged and the first formal evidentiary “reasonable cause” hearing takes place, however, counsel must necessarily review the incoming complaint and supporting materials and decide
whether to elevate the matter to an “investigation” stage, however defined.
Counsels’ survey responses distinguish between an informal and formal
“investigation,” so it is difficult to determine the extent to which these matters are in fact investigated beyond a reading of the complaint by a staff attorney. Will counsel limit their review to the four corners of the complaint,
or will they request the accused lawyer’s response? Will they check court
records to substantiate the allegations, or call the complainant or witnesses
for their statements? There appears to be no consistency across jurisdictions with respect to the elements and parameters of a “review” versus an
“investigation,” whether formal or informal.
3. Statutory or Rule Requirements
Several respondents indicated that their agency operated under
procedural rules that address the specific situation of a pending civil or
criminal matter. These agencies’ rules either mandate that the agency not
be deterred from initiating a prosecution,113 or expressly permit a prosecution in that situation.114 In contrast, one agency’s rules explicitly defer
complaints of litigation misconduct in federal court to those courts (with no
similar reference requirement to state courts).115

author). Counsel in Missouri stated his office “makes determinations as to whether or not to open
investigative files based on complaints and/or reports made to the office. Each complaint or report
received is reviewed based on the factual allegations contained therein.” Pratzel, supra note 112.
113
See Haw R. Sup. Ct. 2.10 (“Processing of complaints shall not be deferred or abated because of substantial similarity to the material allegations of pending criminal or civil litigation,
unless authorized by the Board in its discretion, for good cause shown.”)
114
See Ala. St. R. Disc. P. 14 (“Disciplinary proceedings shall not be deferred or abated because of substantial similarity to the material allegations of pending criminal or civil litigation
involving the respondent, unless authorized by the Disciplinary Board, in its discretion, for good
cause shown.”)
115
See Neb. S. Ct. R. § 3-309(A)(2). Section 3-309 of the Supreme Court Rules of Nebraska
states, in relevant part:
Upon receipt of a grievance against a member arising out of conduct in a pending or
closed federal case, including civil, criminal, bankruptcy, grand jury, or federal proceeding in which the lawyer may be a witness, Counsel for Discipline shall disclose
and refer such grievance to the federal judge assigned to the case for consideration of
discipline under the federal attorney discipline rules. Any investigation of such grievance by Counsel for Discipline shall be held in abeyance until the federal court resolves the matter, provided, however, that if the federal court fails to resolve the grievance in a timely manner, Counsel for Discipline may take further action without regard
to the referral to the federal court. Discipline by the federal court under its disciplinary
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What if a state supreme court finds that a prosecutor’s statements
were not prejudicial and do not require reversal? Will that same court later
find the prosecutor sanctionable for litigation misconduct if the lawyer discipline agency finds his or her statements were false? One respondent cited
this specific problem, noting that, while his agency would not be deterred
from investigating the matter despite a court’s exoneration, these circumstances may negate the possibility that the same court would find the nonreversible conduct to be unprofessional.116
4. Exoneration Cases
Disciplinary counsel generally expressed concerns regarding (1)
the likelihood of meeting their clear and convincing burden in such cases;
and (2) noted that these cases are the most problematic. One respondent
wrote that his office “typically” does not seek additional sanctions if court
sanctions were imposed; but he added that “our rules do allow us to prosecute cases regardless of what a judge may do in any given situation concerning unethical conduct. There are instances where we have continued to
prosecute cases even when a judge acts.”117
One counsel responded forthrightly to this hypothetical: “The fact
that a lawyer was found not to be in contempt of court would certainly not
be determinative because the State Bar is limited to addressing whether a
lawyer violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, which could certainly
have occurred notwithstanding a court determination that the lawyer was
not in contempt of court.”118 Even more direct was counsel who stated “[i]f
someone submits a complaint that an attorney intentionally made a misrepresentation to a court, that alleged rule violation would trigger the opening

rules does not preclude discipline under these rules pursuant to the Nebraska Rules of
Professional Conduct.
116
See E-mail from Mark A. Weber, Counsel for Discipline & the Unauthorized Practice of
Law, Neb. Sup. Ct., Admin. Off. of the Ct. and Prob., to author (March 16, 2021, 9:14 CST) (on
file with author).
117
See Letter from Roman A Shaul, Gen. Couns., Off. of Gen. Couns., Ala. Bar Assoc., to
author (April 15, 2021) (on file with author); see also Ala. St. R. Disc. P. 14 (stating rule to which
counsel was referring).
118
See E-mail from Katherine Jean, Couns., N.C. State Bar, to author (March 18, 2021, 2:06
CST) (on file with author); see also Email from Anne Taylor, Chief Disciplinary Couns., The
Disciplinary Bd. of the N.M. Sup. Ct., to author (May 4, 2021, 10:46 CST) (on file with author)
(“This office independently investigates alleged violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
regardless of whether the attorney has been sanctioned by a court.”); E-mail from Kara J. Erickson, Disciplinary Couns., Disciplinary Bd. of the Sup. Ct. of N.D. Sup. Ct., to author (March 242021, 1:38 CST) (on file with author) (“In response to your inquiry, we would prosecute regardless. In fact, I have a few of those matters pending currently.”)
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of a disciplinary complaint requiring the attorney to provide a response.”119
Another responding counsel stated that “this office routinely investigates
cases of alleged intentional false statements made by a lawyer to a tribunal,
regardless of whether the tribunal addressed such conduct.”120
Regarding these cases, some counsel responses reflected dissonance about an investigation decision in exoneration cases: “We would
generally open such an investigation, though if the Court considered the
statement and made a substantive ruling, we might defer to the Court’s determination and not investigate, or if we do investigate, not find misconduct.”121 Similarly, another noted: “Decisions by a trial court in an underlying matter, although potentially of assistance, may or may not impact this
Office’s investigation and docketing of a matter.”122
Other counsel noted the difficulty in such cases: “Where a judge
has evaluated the alleged falsity of a statement and the evidence available
to the court is the same as that available to [the agency], it is likely to be
difficult or impossible to get a special master to substitute a different finding.”123 Another agreed, stating that she would not decline to investigate
simply due to the fact of exoneration, but would like to have “other corroborating evidence.”124 One disciplinary counsel stated that his agency would
119
See Letter from Kelly Reilly Travers, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Disciplinary Board,
R.I. Sup. Ct., to author (July 12, 2021) (on file with author); see also Email from John S. Nichols,
Disciplinary Couns., Sup. Ct. of S.C., to author (July 8, 2021, 6:38 CST) (on file with author):

If the information, if true, would be misconduct, then we open a case and investigate
the information. . . . Our burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence, and proving
misconduct under that standard is not foreclosed by the trial court’s ruling since the
court likely exercised discretion under our version of Civil Procedure Rule 11 not to
find contempt or enter sanctions. . . . [T]he trial court’s ruling cannot “exonerate” the
lawyer even if the trial court decides not to act. We would vigorously pursue a case
against the lawyer before our Commission on Lawyer Conduct and then the Supreme
Court. Assuming no disciplinary history, the lawyer would face a suspension of at least
9 months up to disbarment, depending upon aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Email from Nichols, supra note 119; see also Letter from Keith L. Sellen, Dir., Off. of Lawyer
Regul., Sup. Ct. of Wis., to author (March 19, 2021) (on file with author) (“Upon a court sanction
or lack thereof, we would nevertheless investigate . . . . We receive allegations and investigate
them in the context of professional ethics norms.”)
120
See E-mail from Mark W. Gifford, Off. of Bar Couns., Wyo. State Bar, to author (July 15,
2021, 9:54 CST) (on file with author).
121
See E-mail from Tara M. van Brederode, Dir. of Att’y Discipline & Admin., Att’y Disciplinary Bd., Iowa Sup. Ct. Off. of Pro. Regul., Iowa Jud. Branch, to author (July 12, 2021, 10:43,
CST) (on file with author).
122
See Letter from Brian R. Moushegian, Gen. Couns., Att’y Discipline Off., N.H. Sup. Ct.
to author (July 12, 2021) (on file with author).
123
See E-mail from James S. Lewis, supra note 112.
124
See E-mail from Seana Willing, Chief Disciplinary Couns., State Bar of Tex., to author
(March 22, 2021, 3:06 CST) (on file with author).
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consider the court’s reasoning in making its decision to pursue a prosecution: “We would investigate the allegation notwithstanding the court’s determination that the lawyer had not violated the relevant statute of court
rule. Of course, we would analyze the court’s reasoning in making our
own determination whether there was a violation of the RPCs.”125
D.C. disciplinary counsel gave the following thoughtful response:
If the court before which the representations were made
found that the lawyer should not be sanctioned, that would
be a formidable, but perhaps not dispositive barrier. Again,
the facts would govern. It could be, for example, that under
the court rules only intentional, as opposed to reckless,
misstatements are sanctionable, whereas under our different rules, reckless statements were sanctionable. Also,
many judges will make findings that statements of law or
fact are unsupported, but are reluctant to impose sanctions,
just because judges don’t like to do that. If the judge makes
an affirmative finding that the statements are not false, we
would be hard pressed to proceed, however. We have to
prove our cases by clear and convincing evidence, and if
the judge to whom the statements were directed does not
find that she had been misled, it would be almost impossible to prove there is sufficient evidence of a violation.126
The DOJ would also review a complaint despite exoneration:
Our office would nonetheless review the allegation, even if
the court made an affirmative ruling that no such statement
was made. As you point out, defense attorneys may later
raise such an issue even though it was not brought to the
court’s attention. We would review those allegations as
well. Whether we would conduct a full investigation regarding the allegations would be based on a review of all
available information and a preliminary determination

125
See E-mail from Charles Centinaro, Dir., Off. Of Att’y Ethics, Sup. Ct. of N.J., to author
(July 20, 202, 9:02 CST) (on file with author).
126
See Email from Phil Fox, Disciplinary Couns., D.C. Bd. of Pro. Resp., to author (March
25, 2021, 10:24 CST) (on file with author).
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based on that review that additional investigation could result in a finding of professional misconduct.127

Other counsel responded variously that exoneration would be “a
factor” in their decision to investigate, but would “not be determinative”;128
that they would take a court decision “into consideration when deciding
whether to proceed with a formal charge or dismiss the matter”;129 that exoneration would be “relevant in the overall assessment of a report of misconduct”;130 or that it would “impact” their decision to investigate but not
prevent it, noting that “other or additional allegations” would make it more
likely that an investigation would be conducted.131
5. Relative Severity of False Statements of Law and Fact
An interesting point was raised by discipline counsel for
South Carolina. He wrote:
[A] false statement of law violates a different rule and is
generally not as egregious as a false statement of fact (i.e.,
a lie). The adversary or the judge are certainly capable of
verifying the holding of a cited case, the provisions in a
statute, the terms of a regulation or other authority so as to
not rely on a false statement of the law. But a false statement of fact is not easily uncovered and may lead the decision-maker to rule based upon the lie, which strikes at the

127
See E-mail, from Jeffrey R. Ragsdale, Chief Couns., Dep’t of Just. Off. Of Pro. Resp., to
author (April 2 2021, 7:30 CST) (on file with author).
128
See Letter from Douglas J. Ende, Chief Disciplinary Couns., Off. of Disciplinary Couns.,
Wash. State Bar Assoc. to author (April 1, 2021) (on file with author). Counsel wrote:

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) has no general policy to decline to investigate such allegations. ODC would review a grievance alleging such misconduct and
make a decision about whether to further investigate based on the totality of the circumstances presented. If the court had reviewed the allegations and made a decision to
‘exonerate’ the lawyer, that could be a factor in determining whether further investigation or action would be warranted.
Id.
129
See Email from Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Couns., Off. of Disciplinary Couns.,
Sup. Ct. of Ohio, to author (July 23, 2021, 9:06 CST) (on file with author).
130
See Letter from Kate F. Baird, Deputy Disciplinary Admin., Off. of the Kan.Disciplinary
Admin., to author (March 22, 2021) (on file with author).
131
See Email from Pamela D. Bucy, Chief Disciplinary Couns., Off. of Disciplinary Couns.,
Mont. Sup. Ct., to author (March 15, 2021, 2:05 CST) (on file with author).
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heart of the system of justice (that’s why perjury is so detrimental and so serious an offense).132
This would be true in an ideal world. Unfortunately, some judges
are not so conscientious and do not conduct their own research to ascertain
the correct statement of the law. Where opposing counsel is not present to
contradict the alleged false statement of law, there are judges who will
simply rely on a sole lawyer’s representations regarding the law when the
opponent is a pro se litigant. It is true that judges need not conduct legal
research for a pro se litigant; but neither should they ignore the pro se’s
disadvantages when arguing against a lawyer about what the law is. While
affirmative legal research assistance may not be required, a judge should
conduct independent research where a pro se litigant’s statement of law is
in direct conflict with that of opposing counsel.
VII. DISCUSSION
A.

The Institutional Choice Question

Professor Joy’s aforementioned position is that an appropriate institutional choice (or, implicit agreement) has been made by and between
federal courts and state lawyer discipline agencies that the latter will defer
to the courts for disposition of litigation misconduct complains; this was
based on data showing little or no disciplinary enforcement of such complaints. While this conclusion appears sound, it should be noted that there
are numerous possible causes for a lack of enforcement, such as: the reluctance of lawyers to report each other’s misconduct; clients’ lack of
knowledge that misconduct occurred; the misconduct was not known to the
court, or it was assumed not to have occurred because the offending lawyer
prevailed in his or her client’s case; and other possibilities. A separate issue
is whether leaving litigation to the courts is a good idea.
Joy argues for deference to courts because judges have “both the
historical role of the judiciary and . . . play a key role in regulating lawyers’
behavior in bringing and defending cases.”133 He cites the lack of recidivism in Rule 11 offenders as support of his contention that “judicially imposed sanctions are working.”134
Professor Joy’s position fails to recognize that lawyer discipline
agencies do not enforce court rules, though the ethical norms they enforce
132
133
134

See Email from Nichols, supra note 119.
See Joy, supra note 11, at 811.
See Joy, supra note 11, at 812.
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prohibit similar acts. The agencies determine fitness to practice law,
whereas courts are instead focused on instances of misconduct defined by a
single court rule in a single case. Courts themselves may be unwilling to
address misconduct for a variety of reasons, including possible bias in favor of the offending lawyer, not wanting to hurt a lawyer’s career, not
wanting to get tangled up in possible future disciplinary hearings, etc.
There are many possible reasons not to impose sanctions on a lawyer, and a
lack of reporting to the discipline agency—or an agency’s unwillingness to
prosecute such a case—allows lawyers who engage in unprofessional litigation misconduct to remain unaccountable.
Professor Joy is also incorrect in his view that the ABA Model
Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement do not consider Rule 11-type complaints as falling into the “serious misconduct” category, warranting severe
sanctions. Litigation misconduct, he argues, (a) does not involve misappropriation of funds; (b) does not result in or is not likely to result in prejudice to a client or other person; and (c) does not involve dishonest, deceit,
fraud or misrepresentation.135 “Thus, except in extreme cases of Rule 11
violations, or for lawyers who repeatedly violate Rule 11, the disciplinary
enforcement rules permit potential ethics violations based on Rule 11 violations to be treated as lesser misconduct that would, if pursued by disciplinary authorities, not normally result in sanctions restricting the putative
lawyer’s right to practice law.”136
The deficiency in his argument is obvious. Litigation misconduct
often involves dishonesty and misrepresentation; that is the essence of false
statements of law or fact, concealment of material evidence, and other serious ethics rule violations. Such misconduct can result in prejudice to a client, not to mention the public trust, when the outcome of litigation is a
product of the misconduct. Clarification of the matter by the ABA standards committee would be useful.
Professor Joy’s last reason in support of his position that deference
to courts is preferable is that the legal profession has failed to coordinate
with state disciplinary agencies following imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.
This, he argues, is “a wise choice, one that enables judges to control lawyers’ litigation conduct directly, to fashion appropriate remedies, and to also impose remedies close in time to the offense.”137
I submit that the facts of the case study described above establish
the real possibility that serious litigation misconduct can be overlooked by
135

See Joy, supra note 11, at 813.
See Joy, supra note 11, at 812-13 (citing MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT r. (9)(B) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2007)).
137
See Joy, supra note 11, at 814.
136
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courts and disciplinary agencies. The results of the survey of disciplinary
counsel reflect unanimity among them that their agencies will not be deterred from conducting a review of such allegations despite a court ruling
on the matter, or lack thereof. Moreover, the weakness of the arguments
favoring deference to courts for lawyer discipline—illustrated by the
ARDC’s rationales for refusing to investigate in this case study—
establishes that leaving litigation misconduct to judges will not adequately
address such misconduct.
B.

Recommendations

The making of false statements to a tribunal or engaging in other
litigation misconduct has been prohibited in the practice of law for centuries.138 The ABA’s model lawyer discipline enforcement rules state that
“[p]roviding a regulatory system to deter unethical behavior should remain
the highest priority of the judicial branch.”139
Do the justifications cited by the ARDC for its refusal to investigate the case (i.e., that deference must be given to court orders and that
complaints of misrepresentation of law and fact made in litigation are
merely “arguments, characterizations, or conclusions”) have any merit? I
suggest not. The agency failed in its duty to ensure that the public is protected from unethical lawyers, in court or out of court. Its “institutional
choice” to defer to courts is not easily understood by those who file litigation misconduct complaints, especially those complaints in which a lawyer
is inappropriately exonerated by the court. Nor does the ARDC uphold its
duty to the legal profession in disciplining unethical lawyers who misrepresent the law and the facts and take advantage of pro se litigants.140 While,
138

See HON. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 72 (1884) (quoting Gilbert Burnet, LIFE OF SIR MATHEW HALE 72 (5th ed. 1681). “It need hardly be added that a
practitioner ought to be particularly cautious, in all his dealings with the court, to use no deceit,
imposition, or evasion—to make no statements of facts which he does not know or believe to be
true—to distinguish carefully what lies in his own knowledge from what he has merely derived
from his instructions—to present no paper-books intentionally garbled . . . [such as] ‘quoting
precedents of books falsely.’” See id.
139
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. RESP. CONDUCT r. 2 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). (“Public
confidence in the discipline and disability process will be increased as the profession acknowledges the existence of lawyer misconduct, and shows the public what the agency is doing about
it.”)
140
See MODEL CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT §7.2-2 (FED’N. OF LAW SOC’Y OF CAN. 2004).
Under Canadian legal ethics rules, the kind of chicanery engaged in by the lawyers in this case,
including the sanctions sought against their pro se adversary, is referred to as “sharp practice.”
Id. “A lawyer must avoid sharp practice and must not take advantage of or act without fair warning upon slips, irregularities or mistakes on the part of other lawyers not going to the merits or
involving the sacrifice of a client’s rights.” Id. Additional provisions in the Canadian Code in-
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as lawyers, we are proud to say that ours is a self-regulated profession, the
case described herein raises serious questions as to the viability of that position.141
The data reported here shows minimal enforcement of litigation
misconduct in Illinois, which, admittedly, could be attributable to the issuance of private reprimands that are undetectable in ARDC records and reports. This is consistent with the literature and data from other jurisdictions.142 In contrast, discipline counsel responding to the survey uniformly
noted that they would consider litigation misconduct complaints independently of court sanctions imposed, or lack thereof. The contradiction
between the weak enforcement data and responding disciplinary counsels’
willingness to pursue complaints of litigation misconduct needs further
study.
There appears to be a gaping hole in lawyer ethics enforcement
with respect to litigation misconduct. It requires the promulgation of rules
to prevent the de facto immunity of litigators who are given a pass by trial
courts, wittingly or unwittingly, whose misconduct is never referred to a
disciplinary agency, or whose misconduct is not investigated by a disciplinary agency. I propose the following measures to address this problem:
• Establish a disciplinary rule mandating that all litigation conduct complaints filed by lawyers be investigated (not just “reviewed”); and include a definition of “investigation.”

clude knowingly attempting to deceive the tribunal, knowingly misstating information, deliberately refraining from “informing the tribunal” and placing the lawyer’s credibility at issue. Id. r. 5.12(e) (stating rule that prohibits “knowingly attempt[ing] to deceive or participate in the deception
of a tribunal or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or law,
presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed,
or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime or illegal conduct”); id. r. 5.1-2(f) (prohibiting “knowingly misstating the contents of a document”); id. r. 5.1-2(i) (stating rule that prohibits “deliberately refrain[ing] from informing the tribunal of any pertinent adverse authority that the lawyer
considers to be directly in point and that has not been mentioned by an opponent”); id. r. 5.2-1
cmt. (noting “[t]he lawyer must not in effect become an unsworn witness or put the lawyer’s own
credibility in issue”).
141
See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 21 (1986). “[A]s in other areas in
which occupations and professions are licensed and credentialed, it seems clear that the claim of
the legal profession for special and total exemption from external, nonlawyer control faces a
skeptical public and uncertain future.” Id. The case described is a good example of the reason
for public skepticism of the claim that self-regulation is preferred over public regulation.
142
See Joy, supra note 11, at 807-08 (citing ABA survey results confirming that the overwhelming number of disciplinary complaints generally are dismissed, and citing Missouri
opened-complaint data showing “not a single complaint involved filing frivolous lawsuits.”)
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• An initial investigation should include the requesting of a response from
the accused and examining the records submitted by the complainant
and any relevant court records in the case.
• Discipline agencies should follow Restatement and ABA guidelines for
disciplinary enforcement, including, inter alia: (1) the opportunity of a
complainant to receive and reply to an accused lawyer’s response to a
complaint; and (2) notice of closure of a complaint and an opportunity
for the complainant to request a review of the closure decision.
• All reprimands or other disciplinary sanctions regarding litigation misconduct (as distinguished from client-centered complaints) should be
publicly accessible so potential clients, lawyer adversaries, and judges
will know whether a lawyer has been sanctioned for such conduct in the
past.
• Eliminate the “institutional choice” policy made by some disciplinary
agencies to defer litigation conduct complaints to courts, or defer them
to courts in specific cases, by adopting a rule expressly permitting the
agencies to pursue such complaints despite a closed or pending civil or
criminal case.
• Do not consider a court’s refusal to impose sanctions on a lawyer dispositive of the discipline question; rather consider the order and its reasoning as one factor to be considered in making a separate disciplinary
finding based on the record, other corroborating evidence, the requirements imposed by the rules of professional responsibility, and the legal
obligations of the lawyer discipline agency.
• Clarify and elevate the characterization of litigation misconduct complaints to “serious misconduct” under the ABA’s Model Rules for Disciplinary Enforcement and Model Standards for Lawyer Sanctions.
C.

Counter Argument

Some will disagree with my position and argue that prosecutions
by lawyer disciplinary agencies should not be conducted based on the same
conduct considered by a court before it imposed or refused to impose sanctions. They would argue that disciplinary prosecutions resulting from court
referrals or party complaints under these circumstances would be a form of
double jeopardy.
The double jeopardy clause appears in the Fifth Amendment,
which states individual rights in criminal prosecutions.143 The Clause

143

See U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”)
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protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal
punishments for the same offense, . . . , and then only when
such occurs in successive proceedings, . . .144

The Supreme Court has long held that “a crime under one sovereign’s laws is not ‘the same offence’ as a crime under the laws of another
sovereign. Under this ‘dual-sovereignty’ doctrine, a State may prosecute a
defendant under state law even if the Federal Government has prosecuted
him for the same conduct under a federal statute.”145 The Double Jeopardy
Clause only applies to criminal prosecutions and is not violated by successive prosecutions by different sovereigns. Thus, it cannot apply to the case
of a state court sanctions decision that is followed by the same state’s disciplinary enforcement proceedings.
But, objectors would argue, the general concept should apply.
Why should a lawyer be sanctioned twice for the same misconduct? Or
sanctioned at all for unprofessional conduct when the court just didn’t—or
refused—to impose sanctions? I suggest several reasons justifying subsequent disciplinary agency review and potential additional sanctions.
First, sanctions may have been considered, but inappropriately denied, such as by a judge biased in favor of the accused lawyer. The propriety of later disciplinary action in that case is unquestionable. Alternatively,
the court may have imposed sanctions, but limited them to the actual attorneys’ fees incurred by the opposing party as a product of the misconduct.
Such an award might not be proportional to the severity of the misconduct.
It’s also possible that, if court sanctions were imposed, they were
only assessed for particular acts within the scope of a pleading misconduct
rule (e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). Related acts of misconduct may not be included in the court’s award. Similarly, the court awarding sanctions may
not be aware of prior similar acts when imposing sanctions, assuming the
conduct is a “one–off” situation. A discipline agency would have that information and could impose a more appropriate sanction.
If sanctions are imposed, courts are limited to attorneys’ fees
awards and orders barring a lawyer from making future filings; but a discipline agency, whose purpose is to protect the public from unethical lawyers, can recommend a wide range of sanctions from public and private
reprimands, restitution, attorneys’ fees, orders to attend drug treatment, anger management training, or continuing legal education classes, license
144
See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (citations omitted) (first quoting
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938); and then Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528
(1975)).
145
See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1964 (2019) (rejecting a challenge to the
dual-sovereignty rule).
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suspension, and disbarment. These are sufficient reasons to ensure the independence of lawyer disciplinary agencies from the courts in matters involving alleged litigation misconduct that also constitutes potential professional misconduct.
D.

Future Research

There are many issues that require empirical study in the realm of
lawyer discipline. Confidentiality rules in every state prevent access to case
data reflecting complaints against lawyers that were dismissed by disciplinary counsel (or resulted in a private censure or reprimand). These data
from state discipline agencies would be useful in ascertaining the source,
frequency, and nature of alleged litigation misconduct. To know the reasons for declining to investigate such claims would also be useful with respect to the issue of public protection. What level of severity of a breach of
the duty of candor towards the tribunal is sufficient to invoke the disciplinary process? Legislation or court rules are needed to provide scholars access to aggregate data of this type, which will help us answer the last question while maintaining the need for lawyer confidentiality before initiation
of a formal complaint.
More importantly, such data would be useful in determining
whether disciplinary counsel’s strong sense of independence from courts
translates to actual prosecutions for litigation misconduct. Limited
disciplinary data from Illinois and other states show very little activity in
this regard, despite this state supreme court’s pronouncements in a handful
of cases that litigation misconduct is not tolerated. Studies should be undertaken of more state disciplinary agencies’ prosecution practices for litigation misconduct cases to the extent data are made available.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We return to the original issue of whether the lawyer disciplinary
process can be viewed as an example of legal profession protectionism, as
is often alleged in the case of unauthorized practice of law prohibitions.
Thankfully, the encouraging results of the data collected from the national
survey of disciplinary counsel reflect their firm belief in disciplinary agencies’ independence from courts. They unanimously believe their agency
has a duty to hold lawyers accountable for violating ethics norms notwithstanding the imposition (or non–imposition) of court sanctions. This appears to stand in stark contrast to the view of commentators that lawyer
discipline agencies have a hands-off policy with respect to litigation mis-
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conduct complaints, as well as the decision of the Illinois ARDC to refuse
to investigate the complaint described herein. One would hope that the
agency’s decision does not reflect a general policy of deference to courts
which, in light of the survey responses, would make it a pariah among the
majority of state disciplinary agencies. The ARDC should come into conformity with the independence standard enunciated by disciplinary counsel
in twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the DOJ.
In addition to making more data available regarding rejected complaints or private reprimands of litigation misconduct, implementation of
the aforementioned recommendations, and requiring that discipline agencies evaluate lawyer litigation misconduct independently from courts, will
ensure that the public is protected from lawyers who engage in such conduct. That is the institutional choice that should be made by courts and
regulatory bodies. By not deferring to courts, a robust lawyer disciplinary
process justifies the legal profession’s right of self-governance, evidences a
lack of protectionism, and maintains the public’s trust and confidence in
the justice system.

